Annotated Bibliography (Pamela Sue Anderson)


This is the first book of Butler’s to inform my original proposal of Enhancing (Capable) life because of its profound and moving account of being beside oneself in grief; her idea of being constituted both relationally by attachments to others and by dispossession by the other challenged me deeply (all my senses responded to what sounded true to life), to rethink my fundamental ontology of autonomous life.


This book by Butler follows after and builds upon her writings about precarious life, while becoming more confident of ‘a relational social ontology’, which would be responsive to affects such as fear, rage, desire, loss, love and hate, in political life. Butler introduces the concept of ‘a frame’ - or unit of intelligibility for considering those affects - which in chapter 5, ‘The Claim of Non-Violence’, helps her to sketch the conditions of possibility for non-violence, as ironically the violence of one’s own formation, as ‘the mired and conflicted position of a subject who is injured, rageful, disposed to violent retribution’; so, ‘[t]he struggle against violence accepts that violence is one’s own possibility’ (171).


This latest book by Butler to inform my project for Enhancing Life captures the crucial fact that ‘I’ am, as a (bodily) creature, ‘affected by’ something outside and prior to myself, whose activities form this bodily life. In particular, I rely on Butler’s reading of Spinoza’s *Ethics*, specifically on how his *Ethics* conceives of ‘enhancing life’, one’s own at the same times as others’s life, by the way in which we constitute expressive actions to either augment or diminish life.


This monograph (of published doctoral work) was suggested to me when I was looking for an argument which conceived and defended ‘vulnerability’ as an ‘ethical’ concept, as an openness or exposure to affection, and not merely a condition from which individuals need protection by others, or need to protect themselves, even when this ‘protection’ required violence and a turning in on oneself. Gilson offers an extremely helpful overview of ‘the ethics of’ vulnerability, including what has been written about the normative significance of vulnerability, the avoidance and disavowal of vulnerability, and a rethinking of vulnerability; this aided my own thinking about a positive responsiveness to one’s own and others’s vulnerability, while not making ‘cognitive acknowledgement of vulnerability’ a priority over experiencing, sensing, feeling and seeing vulnerability.


This publication is extremely significant for my (novel) concept of ‘vulnerability’ which depends on some background at least on ‘affect’ theory, especially ‘affects’ and ‘affection’ as conceived by
two, however different (and difficult), major thinkers: Gilles Deleuze (especially Spinoza’s influence on his view of the body and affects) and Silvan Tomkins. Probyn brings both of the latter two men into her lucid argument concerning ‘shame’, which like other affects, makes us feel, think, act and write in different ways, so that literally ‘writing shame’ reworks how we understand the body and its relation to other bodies.